|
Moral skepticism (or moral scepticism) is a class of metaethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal, claim that moral knowledge is impossible. Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable, objective moral truths. Defenders of some form of moral skepticism include David Hume, J. L. Mackie (1977), Max Stirner, Friedrich Nietzsche, Richard Joyce (2001), Michael Ruse, Joshua Greene, Richard Garner, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006b), and the psychologist James Flynn. Strictly speaking, Gilbert Harman (1975) argues in favor of a kind of moral relativism, not moral skepticism. However, he has influenced some contemporary moral skeptics. ==Forms of moral skepticism== Moral skepticism divides into three subclasses: moral error theory (or moral nihilism), epistemological moral skepticism, and noncognitivism.〔(Moral Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) )〕 All three of these theories share the same conclusions, which are: :(a) we are never justified in believing that moral claims (claims of the form "state of affairs x is good," "action y is morally obligatory," etc.) are true and, even more so :(b) we never know that any moral claim is true. However, each method arrives at (a) and (b) by different routes. Moral error theory holds that we do not know that any moral claim is true because :(i) all moral claims are false, :(ii) we have reason to believe that all moral claims are false, and so, because :(iii) since we are not justified in believing any claim we have reason to deny, we are not justified in believing any moral claims. Epistemological moral skepticism is a subclass of theory, the members of which include Pyrrhonian moral skepticism and dogmatic moral skepticism. All members of epistemological moral skepticism share two things in common: first they acknowledge that we are unjustified in believing any moral claim, and second, they are agnostic on whether (i) is true (i.e. on whether all moral claims are false). *Pyrrhonian moral skepticism holds that the reason we are unjustified in believing any moral claim is that it is irrational for us to believe either that any moral claim is true or that any moral claim is false. Thus, in addition to being agnostic on whether (i) is true, Pyrrhonian moral skepticism denies (ii). *Dogmatic moral skepticism, on the other hand, ''affirms'' (ii) and cites (ii)'s truth as the reason we are unjustified in believing any moral claim. Finally, Noncognitivism holds that we can never know that any moral claim is true because moral claims are ''incapable'' of being true or false (they are not truth-apt). Instead, moral claims are imperatives (e.g. "Don't steal babies!"), expressions of emotion (e.g. "stealing babies: Boo!"), or expressions of "pro-attitudes" ("I do not believe that babies should be stolen.") 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「moral skepticism」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|